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"SWEEPING THE BUSES": FLORIDA'S SEARCH FOR THE APPROPRIATE
TEST IN DETERMINING WHAT CONSTITUTES A SEIZURE IN
REGARD TO THEIR OWN DRUG INTERDICTION PROGRAM
Florida v. Bostick
111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991)
William W Stewart, Jr.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the face of widespread drug use throughout the United States, there has been
an overwhelming attempt by society to lead the "war on drugs."1 In response to
these concerns, there has been an increased effort by law enforcement officials to
utilize new and increasingly common tactics such as the suspicionless police
sweep of buses, planes and automobiles in interstate or intrastate travel.2 One tac-
tic in particular, known as "working the buses,"' has gained widespread attention
throughout the United States. This tactic raises the question of whether a person is
actually seized for Fourth Amendment4 purposes during this brief police-citizen
encounter.5 In Florida v. Bostick, 6 the United States Supreme Court reversed a
Florida State Supreme Court decision holding that every police encounter on a bus
constituted a seizure.' Although the Supreme Court did not abandon the restric-
tive view it developed in Terry v. Ohio,8 the Court did expand the "reasonable per-
son" test in United States v. Mendenhall,9 holding that the appropriate test for
determining whether a mere police encounter becomes a seizure is to take into ac-
count all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter. 0 Then and only then,
should a court be able to determine whether a reasonable passenger would feel free
to decline the officer's requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. 1
This note will examine the tests used historically in determining whether cer-
tain consensual police-citizen encounters trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny and
1. Seventeenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals
1986-1987, 76 GEo. L.J. 521, 532 (1988) [hereinafter Review].
2. Id.
3. Florida v. Bostick, 11l S. Ct. 2382, 2389 (1991). Drug interdiction efforts have led to the use of police
surveillance at bus depots. Id. at 2383. Officers of the Broward County Sheriffs Department routinely board the
buses at various stops and, either randomly or because they suspect in some vague way that the passengers may
be engaged in criminal activity, ask them questions in regard to drug trafficking. Id. This type of drug sweep is
extremely successful in apprehending drug traffickers throughout the United States. Id. at 2390.
4. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
5. Review, supra note 1, at 532.
6. 111S. Ct. 2382 (1991).
7. Id. at 2389.
8. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
9.446 U.S. 544 (1980).
10. Bostick, Ill S. Ct. at 2389.
11. Id. at 2387.
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will also evaluate the merits of each test to see whether certain police conduct con-
stitutes a seizure. Finally, the note will analyze the standard used by the Supreme
Court in Bostick and focus on what should be the appropriate inquiry or scope of
the standard used today.
II. FACTS OF THE CASE
The respondent, Terrance Bostick, was a passenger on a bus when two officers
from the Broward County Sheriffs Department boarded the vehicle and without
articulable suspicion,12 began asking him questions.13 The two officers then re-
quested Bostick's consent to search his luggage for drugs and advised him of his
right to refuse.14 Nevertheless, Bostick consented and the ensuing search uncov-
ered cocaine concealed in Bostick's suitcase.15 The officers, after finding the co-
caine, arrested Bostick and charged him with drug trafficking. 16
At trial, Bostick moved to suppress17 the cocaine on the grounds that it had
been seized on the bus in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.18 The trial
court denied his motion, and before any factual findings were made, Bostick en-
tered a guilty plea. 19 Bostick reserved his right to appeal the denial of the motion to
suppress the cocaine.20 The trial court's decision was subsequently affirmed on
appeal by the Florida District Court of Appeal.2 The district court of appeal did,
however, consider the issue of serious importance and certified a question to the
Florida Supreme Court.22 The Florida Supreme Court thus adopted a per se rule
that randomly questioning bus passengers and seeking consent to conduct a
search, as in the sheriffs practice of "working the buses,"23 is unconstitutional.24
The court's reasoning was that a reasonable person in the respondent's position
would not have felt free to leave the bus.25
12. Probable cause is the existence or combination of circumstances, that if viewed through the eyes of an
experienced police officer, would lead a reasonably prudent person to believe that a crime is being or has been
committed. J. SHANE CREAMER, THE LAW OF ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 9 (3d ed. 1980) thereinafter
CREAMER]. Mere articulable suspicion or belief, unsupported by additional facts or other circumstances, is insuf-
ficient. Id. at 11.




17. See CREAMER, supm note 12, at 92. The suppression of evidence rule, or the exclusionary rule, as it is
generally termed, means that all incriminating evidence that is seized by the police, who at the time went beyond
the scope of their police powers, cannot be used against that person accused in court. Id. Basically, the evidence
is suppressed by the court and never gets admitted at trial. Id. at 93. Physical evidence as well as testimonial
evidence is suppressed when it is seized by police in violation of Fourth Amendment rights. Id.





23. See supra note 3 for an example of Florida's drug interdiction program.
24. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2389.
25. Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153, 1157 (Fla. 1989) (holding that under these circumstances Bostick
would not have felt that he was free to leave or that he was free to disregard the questions and walk away).
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DETERMINING WHAT CONSTITUTES A SEIZURE
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the decision
of the Florida Supreme Court, remanding the case for further proceedings.2" The
Court held that a mere police encounter on a bus does not necessarily constitute a
"seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.27
Il. BACKGROUND AND HIsToRY OF CASE
One of the most cherished and protected rights of our Constitution is the Fourth
Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fourth
Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.29
Since the right to this protection is highly valued in our free society, the Fourth
Amendment places certain limitations or restrictions on some police powers,'
specifically the right to search and seize."
Throughout the United States, an increasing number of drug trafficking cases
have come before the courts. This has ultimately led to efforts by law enforcement
to interdict drug surveillance programs at various locations.32 These concentrated
areas consist of airports, train stations and bus depots. ' Law enforcement person-
nel stationed at these locations routinely approach passengers or individuals, ei-
ther randomly or because of suspicious activity,34 and ask them potentially
26. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2382.
27. Id. at 2386. The Court also held that the appropriate test for determining whether a seizure occurred is
whether, taking into account all of the circumstances present, a reasonable person would feel free to leave the bus
or refuse to answer questions by the police. Id. at 2387. Additionally, the Court rejected Bostick's argument that
he must have been seized, since the "reasonable person" test presumes an innocent person and not a person with a
guilty motive or conscience. Id. at 2388.
28. Rebecca A. Stack, Note, Airport Drug Searches: Giving Content to the Concept of Free and Voluntary Con-
sent, 77 VA. L. REv. 183, 184 (1991).
29. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
30. CREAMER, supra note 12, at 3. According to Creamer, police powers are divided into two general classifi-
cations -investigative powers and arrest powers. Id. Police investigative powers include but are not limited to:
(1) the power to stop, (2) the power to frisk, (3) the power to ask questions, and (4) the power to detain if neces-
sary. Id at 36. Police arrest powers include: (1) the power to use reasonable force, (2) the power to search, and (3)
the power to seize. Id. at 57.
31.Id. at4.
32. Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2384 (1991).
33. Id.
34. Id. Examples of suspicious behavior would probably consist of wearing a long jacket in the middle of sum-
mer, acting extremely nervous around police officers or continuing to observe store personnel for a long period of
time for no legitimate reason. But see CREAMER, supra note 12, at 38, listing the criteria for reasonable suspicion
which can justify police action. The major factors that courts consider when examining the reasonableness of a
police-citizen encounter are: (1) The type of crime suspected ("the more serious the crime suspected, the more
compelling the need to investigate quickly"); (2) the time as well as the place where the officer suspects a crime is
being committed and decides to investigate; (3) the conduct itself that draws the officer's attention to inquire fur-
ther; (4) the officer's knowledge and experience about the suspected crime; and (5) the officer's primary inten-
tion for initiating the inquiry. CREAMER, supra note 12, at 38.
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incriminating questions.3" This type of police sweep has had abundant success in
obtaining illegal narcotics as well as confessions.3" The courts, in turn, have been
flooded with numerous questions of whether such confessions or evidence should
be suppressed due to the violation of the individual's Fourth Amendment rights."'
The essence of the Fourth Amendment is a balancing test, in which the individ-
ual's right of privacy is weighed against the government's interest in preventing
crime. 8 The Fourth Amendment itself draws the distinction in that the seizure
must be reasonable.3 Before one can determine whether a seizure is reasonable,
the first issue that must be decided is whether a seizure in fact has occurred.4" If no
seizure exists, then Fourth Amendment rights are not triggered,41 and a court will
not scrutinize the police actions, nor will the exclusionary rule 2 that requires sup-
pression of illegally obtained evidence be triggered. If a seizure occurs, then the
Fourth Amendment is applicable, and the court will look at various other factors in
deciding whether the seizure was reasonable.' It is of crucial importance, there-
fore, that the courts agree on what constitutes a "seizure.""
35. Bostick, I llS. Ct. at 2384.
36. Ira Mickenberg, Supreme Court Review: Analysis-Criminal Rulings Granted the State Broad Power, 13
NAT'L L.J. 1,7-8 (Aug. 19, 1991). One example of the success of this technique includes a situation in which one
officer searched more than 3,000 bags in a nine month period that resulted in the confiscation of many illegal
drugs. Id. at 7-8 n.5.
37. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (whether suspicionless search in airport was
voluntary so as not to be a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, the Court considered "totality of the circum-
stances"); United States v. Galindo-Hernandez, 674 F Supp. 979, 983 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (following Supreme
Court's "totality of the circumstances" standard).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-07 (1984) (use of exclusionary rule is resolved by
weighing the costs and benefits of excluding the evidence); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) ("the
permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing the intrusion on the individual's
Fourth Amendment interests against its protection of legitimate governmental interests"); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 21-27 (1968) (reasonableness of search and seizure must be evaluated in light of the particular circum-
stances).
39. Thomas K. Clancy, The Supreme Court's Search-for a Definition ofa Seizure: What is a "Seizure"of a Person
Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment ? 27 AM. CiuM. L. RaV. 619, 620 (1990) [hereinafter Clancy].
40. Id. at 620.
41. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,498 (1983) ("if there is no detention- no seizure within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment -then no constitutional rights have been infringed"); United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 552-53 (1980) ("not every encounter between police officer and citizen is intrusion requiring ob-
jective justification"); see also INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984) ("The Fourth Amendment does not
proscribe all contact between the police and citizens, but is designed 'to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interfer-
ence by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals.") (quoting United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976)); cf United States v. Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 540-41 (1985) (re-
jecting standard between reasonable suspicion and probable cause to justify seizure). But see People v. De Bout,
352 N.E.2d 562 (N.Y. 1976) (suggesting that even when there is no seizure, there are still Fourth Amendment
interests to be protected). For a discussion of the De Bour case, see WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 3 SEARCH AND SEIZURE:
A TREATISE ON THE FouRTH AMENDMENT § 9.2(h), at 420-22 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter LAFAVE, 2d ed.i;
Clancy, supra note 39, at 620 (citations originally obtained from this article).
42. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (stating that this rule basically mandates that any time
evidence has been obtained in violation of the search and seizure protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amend-
ment, that evidence cannot be used in court against the defendant).
43. Clancy, supra note 39, at 619-20.
44. Id. at 619.
[Vol. 13:385
DETERMINING WHAT CONSTITUTES A SEIZURE
The Supreme Court has been cautious in defining exactly when a seizure occurs
during a police encounter. s Although the Court is reluctant to define this point too
precisely,44 there are a number of cases in which the Supreme Court has attempted
to narrow the scope of a seizure during a police encounter. 7
A. The Meaning of "Seizure"
1. Physical Restraints and Shows of Authority
The seminal case that laid the foundation for determining whether a seizure has
occurred was the 1968 case of Terry v. Ohio,4' a case that remains a basic source
for understanding the concept of seizure. Before Terry, courts had assumed that
only a full-blown arrest4" resulted in a seizure and that other police activity not
amounting to an arrest did not trigger Fourth Amendment rights." The Terry
Court stated that "the word 'seizure' encompasses a broad range of police conduct,
even if this conduct does not amount to an arrest in the traditional sense."',
In Terry, an officer decided to investigate after observing two men acting suspi-
ciously and fearing that a crime was about to take place.52 The officer questioned
the men, physically restrained them, and eventually discovered a weapon.5 3 Chief
Justice Warren wrote, "[i]t must be recognized that whenever a police officer ac-
costs an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has seized that per-
son."' Chief Justice Warren, however, recognized that the mere questioning of
45. Id. at 621. However, not every governmental interference with a person's freedom of movement consti-
tutes a seizure. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1,9-11 (1973) (grand jury subpoena for voice exemplar,
although enforceable by the court, is not a seizure); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21(1973) (subpoena for
handwriting exemplar is not a seizure); cf Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (order to get out
of car was considered a "de minimis" intrusion on individual after car was stopped for a traffic violation); Clancy,
supra note 39, at 621 n.7.
46. Clancy, supra note 39, at 620-21.
47. See, e.g., California v. Hodari D., Ill S. Ct. 1547 (1991); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593
(1989); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984); Florida v. Rodri-
guez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544
(1980); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
48. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
49. A full-blown arrest is when a person is taken and restrained by the police. This arrest essentially takes
away that person's freedom, and he or she is placed in the custody of the law. CREAMER, supra note 12, at 56. The
four essential elements of a criminal arrest are: "[(1)] an intent by the peace officer to make an arrest[; (2)] real or
pretended authority to arrest[; (3)] a seizure or restraint, actual or constructive[; (4)] an understanding by the
person being seized that he is being arrested." Id.
The law of arrest is consistent throughout the United States and has not significantly changed from the law that
evolved some 350 years ago under the English common law. Id. An arrest has been defined as -[t] he apprehend-
ing or restraining of one's person in order to be forthcoming to answer all alleged or suspected crime.' Id. at 56
(quoting 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries 289, 1679 (1897 ed.)).
50. Rachel A. Van Cleave, Note, Michigan v. Chesternut and Investigative Pursuits: Is there No End to the War
Between the Constitution and Common Sense? 40 HASTINGs L.J. 203, 204-05 (1988) [hereinafter Van Cleave].
51. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-17.
52. Id. at 6-7.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 16. The Court noted that the stopping of an individual to ask questions does not amount to an arrest
by itself. Id. Additionally, the ground upon which the police officer questions the citizen may be far less incrimi-
nating than the ground fbr an arrest, and the exclusionary rule cannot properly be invoked to exclude the evidence
of legitimate law enforcement practices. Id. at 13-15.
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the individual did not constitute a restraint -on that person's freedom."5 He as-
sumed that until the individual was physically seized, no intrusion of Fourth
Amendment rights had occurred."6 Justice White, concurring in Terry, also de-
clared that nothing in the Constitution prevents this type of police investigatory ac-
tivity.
57
Street encounters between police and citizens are incredibly rich in diversity
and range from exchanges of friendly conversation to situations amounting to a
hostile confrontation.' Nevertheless, the court in Terry asserted that not all per-
sonal interaction between police and citizens constitutes a "seizure." 9 "Only when
the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way re-
strained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred. 60
The Terry court articulated two ways to determine when an officer has seized a
person: (1) by physical force61 or (2) by a show of authority.62 In either instance,
there must be a restraint on liberty for a seizure to occur.6
A "show of authority" might include circumstances such as (1) the threatening
presence of several officers; (2) the display of a weapon by the seizing officers; (3)
physical contact between the officer and the citizen; or (4) the language or de-
meanor of the officer indicating that compliance with the officer's request may be
compelled." Justice White, concurring with the majority in Terry, echoed the
view that "there is nothing in the Constitution which prevents [the] police from ad-
dressing questions to anyone on the streets."65 Justice Harlan stated that the ordi-
nary person on the street has a corresponding right to ignore his interrogator and
just walk away.66
55. Id. at 19 n.16.
56. Id. (holding that it is difficult to tell with preciseness whether a seizure took place prior to the police offi-
cer's physical contact when he searched Terry for weapons. Up to that point, it may be assumed that the officer
did not interfere with any constitutionally protected right).
57. Terry, 392 U.S. at 34-35 (White, J., concurring).
58. Terry, 392 U.S. at 13 (stating that these encounters range from wholly friendly exchanges of pleasantries
or assistance with information to extremely violent and hostile situations having a potential for severe physical
harm and even death).
59. Id. at 19 n. 16 (holding that prior to the officer's initiation of physical contact for purposes of searching
Terry for weapons, it can be assumed that no seizure took place).
60. Id.
61. Id. See, e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 67 (1968) (grabbing a person by their collar amounts to a
seizure). But cf INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210,220-21 (1984) (merely touching a person on their shoulder to ask
a question is not a seizure).
62. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16. See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) (routine traffic
stop constituted a seizure); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,417-18 (1981) (flashing lights on a police car
amounted to a show of authority thereby seizing motorist); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 546
n. 1 (1976) (check point used by police caused motorist to slow down to the point of being seized).
63. Clancy, supra note 39, at 621.
64. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 3 SEARCH AND SEizuRE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 53-55 (1978)
[hereinafter LAFAVE].
65. Terry, 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 32-33 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 n.6 (1969) (hold-
ing that police have a right to ask a citizen a question, but they do not have a right to compel an answer from that
citizen).
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DETERMINING WHAT CONSTITUTES A SEIZURE
In other "show of authority" cases, the Court has had great difficulty in decid-
ing under what circumstances a seizure has taken place. 67 Nevertheless, in an at-
tempt to provide a uniform tool to aid the lower courts in determining when a show
of authority seizure has occurred, the Court embraced the "reasonable person
test."68 This test focuses on the objective belief of whether, under the circum-
stances, the individual felt physically restrained.69
2. The Reasonable Person Standard
After the Terry decision, it was over a decade before the Court addressed the
issue of whether a seizure eventuated short of a physical restraint.70 It was not until
1980 that the Supreme Court attempted to formulate an objective test to measure
when a seizure, short of a physical restraint, occurs.71 Justice Stewart, in his ma-
jority opinion, proposed the "reasonable person test" as the appropriate standard
in United States v. Mendenhall.72
Justice Stewart's analysis began by repeating the Terry Court's admonition that
a seizure occurs only when the officer by way of force or "show of authority" has
restrained the liberty of a person."a He further reiterated that the primary purpose
of the Fourth Amendment "is not to eliminate all contact between the police and
the citizenry, but 'to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement
officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals.'"" The crucial test
then in this situation appears to be whether the officer's action would be consid-
ered offensive or restraining if it had occurred between two ordinary citizens."
In Mendenhall, federal agents wearing no uniforms and displaying no weapons,
approached the defendant and requested, but did not demand, to see Mendenhall's
identification at a public airport.76 After the agents found a discrepancy in her
identification, the agents asked if she would consent to accompany them to an of-
fice for further questions.77 While there, the defendant voluntarily consented to a
67. See infra notes 194-214 and accompanying text.
68. Clancy, supra note 39, at 625.
69. Id. at 622-25.
70. Id. at 625.
71. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
72. Id. at 554 (holding that "a person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if,
in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was
not free to leave").
73. Id. at 552-53 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16 (1968)).
74. Id. at 554 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976)).
75. The main requisite is that the person being questioned by police remains free to disregard the questions
and just walk away. Id. at 554. There is no intrusion or particular objective justification required if a "reasonable
person" has not been arbitrarily and oppressively disturbed by the police. Id.
76. Id. at 547-48. In this case the federal agents thought it relevant that (1) the respondent was arriving on a
flight from Los Angeles, a city responsible fbr much of the heroin brought into Detroit; (2) the respondent was
extremely nervous when she left the plane and appeared to look out for officers; (3) the respondent left the termi-
nal without claiming any luggage; and (4) "the [defendant] changed airlines for her flight out of Detroit." Id. at
547 n. 1.
77. Id. at 548.
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search which subsequently turned up illegal narcotics." a Although the defendant
contended that she was seized upon the initial interrogation after departing the
plane, Justices Stewart and Rehnquist opined that the defendant had not been
seized. 9
Justice Stewart stated that, when the agents initially approached Mendenhall,
she did not have any reason to feel threatened or confined to one area.8" Justice
Stewart did not believe this encounter escalated into a seizure when the agents
identified themselves or when they asked for the defendant's identification.81 As a
consequence, Justice Stewart found that the defendant's consent to accompany the
agents to the airport office was not tainted by the agents' previous conduct. 2 Jus-
tice Stewart concluded in Mendenhall that the defendant could have walked away
from the officers at any time and felt free to disregard the questions."
The Mendenhall Court also reasoned that characterizing every police-citizen
encounter on the street as a "seizure," and not advancing any interest secured by
the Fourth Amendment, would impose unrealistic limitations on legitimate law
enforcement practices.' The Court went on to reason that '"[w]ithout such investi-
gation, those who were innocent might be falsely accused, those who were guilty
might wholly escape prosecution, and many crimes would go unsolved."'85 In
short, the Court suggested that the security for all citizens would be diminished. 6
The "objective" test in Mendenhall essentially placed more emphasis on the total-
ity of the circumstances involved. These circumstances that might indicate a sei-
zure, even where the person made no attempt to leave, would be the "threatening
presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical
touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indica-
ting that compliance with the officers' request might be compelled. "87
78. Id. at 548-49.
79. Id. at 551-57 (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.) (the defendant was not seized merely because the agents
approached her and began asking questions). It was also not enough to constitute a seizure that the person posing
the few questions happened to be a police officer. Id. Nothing in the facts of the case indicated that the defendant
had any objective reason to believe that she was not free to leave the area and end the conversation with the po-
lice. Id.
80. Id. at 555. Likewise, in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), the same Court recognized that where offi-
cers questioned Brown in a dark alley concerning his reason for being there and where Brown refused to identify
himself, up to that point, there was no seizure.
81. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 545.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 554.
85. Id. (quoting Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963) and citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 225 (1973)).
86. Id.
87. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207 n.6 (1972); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16 (1968); LAFAvE, supra note 64, at 53-55; U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET No..27-22,
INUTARY CRIMINAL LAW EvIDENCE 19-2 (July 15, 1987).
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DETERMINING WHAT CONSTITUTES A SEIZURE
Both the Mendenhall Court and Professor LaFavea8 imply that it is a sound "so-
cial policy" to allow police to stop and question persons even absent criminal sug-
gestion.8" This policy is probably based on the needed support for law enforcement
to help their efforts in the "war on drugs."9
Just three years after the Mendenhall decision, the Court was again faced with a
similar situation in the case of Florida v. Royer. 91 In this case, agents approached
the defendant at the public airport and requested to see identification.92 After some
confusion about the identification, the agents requested that the defendant accom-
pany them to a large storage room for further questioning.9" Thereafter, the de-
fendant, Royer, allowed the agents to search his luggage, and once more the Court
had to decide whether the consent was the "fruit of an unlawful seizure" or a sei-
zure at all. 9"
The case itself produced five separate opinions, with the plurality opinion of
Justice White concluding that Royer was seized under Fourth Amendment princi-
ples.9 5 Justice White summarized that "[w]hat had begun as a consensual inquiry
in a public place had escalated into [a seizure]" when officers retained Royer's lug-
gage, identification and airline ticket.96
Justice White applied Justice Stewart's "reasonable person" standard from Men-
denhall, but in contrast to the Court's decision in Mendenhall, Justice White held
that Royer was seized, although stating that the initial request for the defendant's
identification did not amount to a seizure.
88. Professor LaFave is considered to be one of the foremost scholars on constitutional law. See LAFAVE 2d
ed., supra note 41 and accompanying text; see also Tracey Macin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The
Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1258, 1301 (1990) [hereinafter Maclin]; Yale Kamisar,
Introduction: Trends and Developments with Respect to that Amendment "Central to Enjoyment of Other Guaran-
tees of the Bill ofRights," 17 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 409, 410 (1984).
89. Maclin, supra note 88, at 1301.
90. Id. at 1302.
91. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
92. Id. at 494.
93. Id.
94. Van Cleave, supra note 50, at 211 (citing Royer, 460 U.S. 491). If the brief encounter amounted to a sei-
zure, the Court was next faced with deciding whether the seizure was a lawful one. Royer, 460 U.S. at 494. De-
tectives in the case believed that Royer's appearance, mannerisms, luggage, and actions fit the "so called 'drug
courier profile. " Id. at 493. The "drug courier profile" is an abstract of characteristics that are commonly fbund
in people that traffic illegal drugs. Id. at 493 n.2. In Royer's case, the agents were attracted to him because: (1)
Royer was carrying extremely heavy luggage; (2) he was between the age of 25-35; (3) he had on casual clothes;
(4) he was very nervous; (5) he used cash to pay for his tickets; and (6) failed to fill out the airline identification
tag. Id.
95. Id. at 493. Several factors led the Court to conclude that Royer was seized. Id. at 501. First, he was con-
fined to a small enclosed area in the airport; police officers told Royer that he was a suspect; Royer's airline ticket
was not returned to him; and the police officer's subsequent impoundment of Royer's luggage made it clear to the
Court that Royer was not free to leave. Id.
96. Id. at 503.
97. Van Cleave, supra note 50, at 211 (citing Royer, 460 U.S. at 501-07).
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The Court in Royer recognized that if the events in the case had amounted to no
more than a permissible police encounter in a public place like a Terry-type stop-"
or that similar to Mendenhall,99 then Royer's subsequent consent to be searched
would have been legally effective. 100 The Court went on to state that in view of all
the circumstances in this case, there existed a "show of authority" and "a reason-
able person would have believed that he was not free to leave."1
The Royer Court did not suggest that there is a litmus test for determining when
an encounter is a consensual one or a seizure.1"2 The Court did recognize, how-
ever, that
[e]ven in the discrete category of ... [certain] encounters, there will be endless
variations in the facts and circumstances, so much variation that it is unlikely that
the courts can reduce to a sentence or a paragraph a rule that will provide unarguable
answers to the question whether there has been an unreasonable search or seizure in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.
103
In Royer, the Court attempted to apply the factors suggested by Justice Stewart
in Mendenhall"o to determine whether there was a "show of authority" amounting
to a seizure.10" The Justices in both Mendenhall and Royer, however, were in dis-
agreement as to the relative weight of the factors that should be given to the Men-
denhall test and, therefore, have failed to apply the test' consistently.
The Mendenhall test gained some acceptance in Royer" 7 and, finally, in the
1984 case of iNS v. Delgado, "8 there appeared to be general consensus among the
Court that the reasonable person standard had been adopted by the Court.1 09 Con-
sistent with Justice Stewart's view of the scope of the use of the reasonable person
test, the majority in Delgado began by citing the Terry language as the "test" for
98. The difference between a police contact and a Terry-type police stop is that a contact occurs when a police
officer merely greets a citizen on the street or asks a person a non-threatening question. CREAMER, supra note 12,
at 41. A Terry-type stop occurs when a police officer encounters a citizen and through an act of compulsion, the
citizen does not feel free to leave due to either a physical restraint or a show of authority. Id. The test to distinguish
between these two is whether the citizen is free to go away. Id.
99. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
100. Royer, 460 U.S. at 501-02.
101. Id. at 502. Cf Mendenhall where the Court held that the defendant was not seized for Fourth Amendment
purposes since no luggage was involved, the airline ticket and identification were immediately returned to Men-
denhall after the questioning and the officers repeatedly told Mendenhall that she could leave at any time. United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557-59 (1980).
102. Royer, 460 U.S. at 506.
103. Id. at 506-07.
104. Van Cleave, supra note 50, at 211.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,502-03 (1983) (plurality opinion of White, J.) (stating several factors
were present which constituted a seizure: (I) retention of Royer's identification and plane ticket; (2) police la-
beled Royer as a suspect; and (3) Royer was requested to accompany police officers without the indication that he
was "free to leave"). See also id. at 514 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (in agreement that Fourth Amendment scru-
tiny applies when "a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave").
108. 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
109. Clancy, supra note 39, at 626.
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determining when a seizure had transpired. '10 The Delgado Court then applied the
same traditional theory that prevailed in Mendenhall and Royer. "' Although a
mere police encounter is consensual at most, it can become a seizure or detention
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, "'if, in view of all the circum-
stances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he
was not free to leave."'"
1 2
In Delgado, armed and uniformed Immigration and Naturalization Service
agents carrying badges and walkie-talkies stood near the exits of the factory while
other agents walked through the factory and questioned employees regarding their
citizenship. ' Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, applied the Mendenhall
standard and found that the agents' actions did not amount to a seizure because
their conduct gave the workers "no reason to believe that they would be detained
.. . if they simply refused to answer."1
1 4
The Delgado Court acknowledged that the workers may not have been free to
leave their worksite anyway, but explained this was not the result of police activ-
ity.1 1 "Ordinarily, when people are at work their freedom to move about has been
meaningfully restricted, not by the actions of law enforcement officials, but by the
111workers' voluntary obligations to their employers.
It appears from the reasoning in Delgado that although the Court utilized the
same Mendenhall test as it had in previous cases, the Court nevertheless narrowed
the scope of the standard by not relying solely on the "free to leave" analysis ap-
plied in Terry, Mendenhall and Royer. 1 7 This trilogy of cases supports the basis of
the Court's current position. The Court does, however, recognize exceptions - for
110. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 215 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 19 n. 16 (1968)) (asserting that not every police
contact with a citizen automatically constitutes a seizure-that a seizure occurs only when there is present a
"show of authority" or some type of physical fbrce used by the police officer).
111. Id.
112. Id. (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).
113. Id. at 212. The agents were acting pursuant to two warrants that indicated that illegal aliens were working
in the factory. Id. The agents moved throughout the factory and approached individuals and asked them several
questions pertaining to their citizenship. Id. If the employee gave a "credible reply" that he was a citizen of the
United States then the agent stopped the questions, but if the employee gave an unsatisfactory reply or admitted
that he was an alien, then the agents requested the proper immigration papers. Id. at 212-13.
114. Id. at 218. Although the respondents argued that the presence of the INS agents near the factory doors
showed the intent to prevent the workers from leaving, the majority stated:
Ordinarily, when people are at work their freedom to move about has been meaningfully restricted, not
by the actions of law enforcement officials, but by the workers' voluntary obligations to their employers.
The record indicates that when these surveys were initiated, the employees were about their ordinary
business, operating machinery and perfbrming other job assignments. While the surveys did cause some
disruption, including the efforts of some workers to hide, the record also indicates that workers were not
prevented by the agents from moving about the factories.
Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. (rejecting respondent's argument that the agents stationed at the doors showed their intent to prevent
workers from leaving because the purpose of agents at the door was to ensure that each and every worker was
asked questions).
117. The Delgado Court also included in the test the fact of where the questioning took place and whether a
reasonable person in that situation would have felt free to leave. Id. at 219. Since it is true that most employees
would not have any reasonable fear that they would be detained by the police when they left the workplace, the
entire workplace was not seized. Id.
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example, where the questioning took place- that must be taken into consideration
in determining the reasonable person approach. 1I8 The Court in Delgado did not
abandon the "free to leave" analysis by any means, but it did recognize that in cer-
tain circumstances where the defendant's freedom of movement is restricted by a
factor independent of police conduct,' 19 an appropriate inquiry or test might be
whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officer's requests or
otherwise terminate the encounter immediately.'20
This appears to be the first time the Supreme Court acknowledged this excep-
tion which essentially changed the scope of the Mendenhall inquiry. The majority
of the Court rejected the idea that the manner in which the surveys were conducted
created a "psychological environment" 2 that made the respondents reasonably
afraid that they were not free to leave.' 22 Only Justices Brennan and Marshall dis-
sented, and although they agreed with the reasonable person test, 123 they firmly
held that in Delgado, the manner in which the surveys were conducted by the
agents clearly demonstrated a "show of authority" of sufficient size and force to
overwhelm the will of any reasonable person. 24
Additionally, the Delgado Court reasoned that although there is no set rule on
whether mere questioning of an individual by police can amount to a seizure, it did
assert from its recent decision in Royer, that interrogation relating to one's identity
or a request for identification by the police does not constitute, by itself, a Fourth
Amendment seizure. 12 The Supreme Court realized that it must apply a definition
of seizure that encompasses a broad range of different confrontations in police-cit-
izen encounters in order to comply with the traditional policies stated in Terry.'26
A few months after the Delgado decision, the Supreme Court was once again
faced with this question in the case of Florida v. Rodriguez. 27 This case was simi-
lar to Royer in that the defendant was stopped and questioned by police officers in
an airport. 128 The Court in Rodriguez followed tradition and agreed that the initial
118. Id. at 218-19.
119. Id. at 218.
120. Id. at 220-21. Although the Court did not go "out on a limb" to set a standard, its reasoning is conservative
enough to take into consideration the reality of certain consensual encounters. The fact that "most citizens will
respond to a police request" without being advised by police that they are free to refuse "hardly eliminates the
consensual nature of the response." Id. at 216.
121. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 220 (the manner in which the agents questioned the employees would hardly instill a
reasonable fiar that the employees were not free to leave the area or go about their business).
122. Clancy, supra note 39, at 635 (citing Delgado, 466 U.S. at 220). It was obvious to the Court that since the
agents were questioning all people in the factory and not just the hourly workers, that any fear was not reasonable
under the circumstances. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 220.
123. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 228 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 229. Although in disagreement as to the final holding of the case, Justice Brennan, nevertheless,
agreed with the majority that there was "no single continuing seizure of the entire work force from the moment
that the INS agents first secured the factory exits until the completion of the survey." Id. at 225 n.2.
125. Id. at 220. But cf Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (when two officers physically detained Brown
after he refused to reveal his identity, the Court held the detention to determine Brown's identity constituted a
seizure).
126. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216-17.
127. 469 U.S. 1 (1984).
128. Id. at 2.
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contact between the officers and defendant, in which they simply asked if he
would step aside and talk with them, was clearly the sort of consensual encounter
that implicates no Fourth Amendment interest.129 Although the Court eventually
held that when the defendant consented to the search of his luggage there was a sei-
zure, the Court disagreed with the trial court's finding that the initial encounter
tainted the subsequent seizure thereby making it unreasonable.
130
This case represents, without a doubt, the consistent principle that a mere con-
sensual encounter between police and citizens does not automatically trigger
Fourth Amendment protection. Only in the presence of certain factors stated in
Mendenhall1 31 will the Court determine if the encounter transformed into a seizure
over a period of time. The Court in Rodriguez based its decision that a seizure oc-
curred on several factors, including the presence of several police officers"3 2 and
the display of badges and weapons which, taken as a whole, would probably pass
the Terry "show of authority" test and the factors laid down in Mendenhall. 133 Al-
though this case breaks no new ground, it is another example of the uniformity that
the Court is developing in deciding when a police-citizen encounter amounts to a
seizure.
There have been several attempts to explain what the reasonable person stand-
ard means. 134 Most notably, Justice Blackmun, writing a concurring opinion in the
recent case of Michigan v. Chesternut, 3' mounted an extensive defense of the "rea-
sonable person" standard. 136 Justice Blackmun stated the test for a seizure was
"necessarily imprecise, because it is designed to assess the coercive effect of the
police conduct, taken as a whole, rather than focus on particular details of that
conduct in isolation."137 He recognized that "what constitutes a restraint on liberty
prompting a person to conclude that he is not free to 'leave' will vary, not only with
129. Id. at 5. In Rodriguez, the Court agreed that the respondent was seized when he agreed to talk with the
police, moved over to where many officers were standing, and subsequently granted permission to search his
luggage. Id. at 6. Ironically, however, the Court stated that the initial contact between Rodriguez and the officers
when they merely asked to speak to him, was "clearly the sort of consensual encounter that implicates no Fourth
Amendment interest." Id. at 5-6. The Court went on to note that "[sluch a temporary detention for questioning in
the case of an airport search is reviewed under the lesser standard enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, . . .and is permis-
sible because of the 'public interest involved in the suppression of illegal transactions in drugs or of any other
serious crime." Id. at 5 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498-99 (1983)).
130. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. at 5 (such a seizure was justified by articulable suspicion).
131. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207
(1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16 (1968); see also LAFAVE, supra note 64, at 53-55 (stating that in the
absence of some other type of evidence, inoffensive contact between a police officer and a citizen, "as a matter of
law," will not constitute a seizure nor trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny).
132. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. at 4.
133. Id. at 4-5.
134. Clancy, supra note 39, at 623.
Referring to the reasonable person test, Justice Brennan has even stated: "This rule properly looks not to
the subjective impressions of the person questioned but rather to the objective characteristics of the en-
counter which may suggest whether or not a reasonable person would believe that he remained free dur-
ing the course of the questioning to disregard the questions and walk away."
Id. at 627 n.49 (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 228 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
135. 486 U.S. 567 (1988).
136. Id. at 573.
137. Id.
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the particular police conduct at issue, but also with the setting in which the con-
duct occurs."138
This case is distinguishable from the Supreme Court's prior decisions specifi-
cally regarding mere encounters between police and citizens in public places, not
in pursuit. In Chesternut, two officers, while in their patrol car, pursued the de-
fendant who was running from them.'39 The defendant discarded a pack of pills
which was subsequently seized by the officers. 'I Justice Blackmun, writing for
the Court in Chesternut, stated that "[w]hile the very presence of a police car driv-
ing parallel to a running pedestrian could be somewhat intimidating, this kind of
police conduct does not, standing alone, constitute a seizure."141 The Chesternut
Court admitted that there is no bright-line rule applicable to all investigatory pur-
suits."2 Although the circumstances in this case were different in that the police
conduct was that of "pursuit" and not consensual in nature, the Court, neverthe-
less, relied on Terry, Mendenhall, Royer and Delgado in determining whether a sei-
zure occurred. '3
Extolling the test's virtues, Justice Blackmun stated:
While the test is flexible enough to be applied to the whole range of police conduct in
an equally broad range of settings, it calls for consistent application from one police
encounter to the next, regardless of the particular individual's response to the actions
of the police. The test's objective standard-looking to the reasonable man's inter-
pretation of the conduct in question -allows the police to determine in advance
whether the conduct contemplated will implicate the Fourth Amendment.'"
It seems inevitable that this "reasonable person" standard also ensures that the
scope of Fourth Amendment protection does not vary with the state of mind for
each individual person being questioned or approached, and that a subjective fo-
138. Id. The Court stated that since there is no "bright-line" rule in deciding whether investigatory pursuits
implicate Fourth Amendment scrutiny, that "any assessment as to whether police conduct amounts to a seizure
*.. must take into account 'all the circumstances surrounding the incident' in each individual case." Id. at 572
(quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984)). Moreover, the Court held that the "police conduct in this
case did not amount to a seizure, for it would not have communicated to the reasonable person that he was not at
liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business." Id. at 567. Justice Blackmun, furthermore, ex-
plained that there were no sirens or flashers used during the pursuit; there was no show of weapons; no applica-
tion of force to stop the vehicle; and there was no order by the police to stop. Id. at 575. Consequently, the Court
conceded that although the investigatory pursuit by the police may have been somewhat intimidating, neverthe-
less, "it was not so intimidating" that a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave or disregard the police
questioning and go on about his business. Id. at 576-77.
139. Id. at 569.
140. id.
141. Id. at 575.
142. See Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599 (1989) (stopping driver by a planned roadblock is a
seizure); Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294,296 (8th Cir. 1989) (no seizure occurred when suspect
failed to stop for flashing lights and eventually crashed into oncoming car); Patterson v. City of Joplin, 878 F.2d
262,263 (8th Cir. 1989) (no seizure when police chased motorcyclist with siren and the use of flashing lights);
United States v. Gonzales, 875 F.2d 875, 879-80 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (use of flashing light by officers in an attempt
to stop speeding boat did constitute a seizure); Clancy, supra note 39, at 626 (the majority of these cases were
originally taken from this article).
143. Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 573-76.
144. Id. at 573.
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cus on the individual involved is too unrealistic for a court basing its decision on a
"reasonable man's" sensitivities. 145
Chesternut cannot be viewed as a return to a more principled view of the rea-
sonable person test since, unlike Terry, Mendenhall and Royer, it involved no ac-
costing prior to the disgorgement of the drugs found.'" Under Terry, both a
physical restraint and an accosting result in a seizure.' 47 Thus, in Chesternut, the
officers were merely exercising their right like ordinary citizens to travel the
streets when the suspect disposed of the drugs in their sight. "
Of the cases where the "reasonable person" test was employed, only in Royer
did a majority hold that a seizure occurred short of physical restraint, and that case
significantly resembled a physical seizure. 49 In contrast, Terry, Mendenhall,
Delgado and Chesternut demonstrated that police activity and conduct will be
given extremely broad margins in considering whether a seizure has occurred.' 0
From the facts of the cases mentioned above, as well as the Court's decisions, one
must conclude that the concept of "seizure" is very restrictive, resulting only when
the level of police intrusion is similar to physical restraint.''
In 1989, the Court in Brower v. County ofInyo 1 2 formulated the "acquisition of
physical control" test. 53 Although the case is distinguishable from the mere police-
citizen encounters illustrated in the cases above, the Court defined a seizure as in-
stances where physical control is achieved. " It appears that physical contact is not
a prerequisite but that physical control is, and that it can be justified by the tradi-
tional standard of "show of authority" as well as physical restraint. 15 Some
scholars might think this new test is more workable because police officers can
now objectively determine when they have control over a citizen. The mere idea
that all police officers will never fabricate their motivations is ludicrous. Although
this test has some merit in that the results of the police-citizen encounter could be
more readily anticipated, it still places too heavy a burden on law enforcement per-
sonnel to choose when they have physical control over a citizen. This test would
ultimately silence all potential victims of certain police investigatory abuse.
145. Clancy, supra note 39, at 626.
146. Id. at 628.
147. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) (recognizing that the Fourth Amendment contemplates seizures
which do not result in a trip to the police station or a final prosecution of a crime).
148. Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 569-70.
149. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
150. Clancy, supra note 39, at 639.
151. Id. at 628-29.
152. 489 U.S. 593 (1989).
153. Id. at 595-96.
154. Id. at 596. The majority opinion in Brower shifted attention away from the reasonable belief of the suspect
and instead focused on the objective actions of the police in determining when a seizure occurs. Id.
155. Id. The Court's definition is somewhat misleading in the sense that it breaks no new ground. The Court
has continuously recognized the "Brower control" theory in relation to the previous "free to leave" analysis. A
person that does not feel free to leave is essentially under the officer's control. So this case adds nothing except
the fact that the Court, in order to draw a less ambiguous line of what constitutes a seizure, prefers that all sei-
zures amount to an actual physical constraint with no chance to leave or disregard the police encounter. Id.
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Finally, just two months before the Bostick decision, the Court extended the
Brower test in California v. Hodari D. ' 6 The Court stated that the word "seizure
readily bears the meaning of a laying on of hands or application of physical force to
restrain movement, even when it is ultimately unsuccessful.""5 7 Again, this case
presents no great judicial revelation since it, too, relies on the previously settled
principles in Terry and Mendenhall. "8 The Court asserted that in order for a sei-
zure to occur, either a physical restraint or a "show of authority" must yield the
subject that is pursued by the police."5 9 This case, however, obviously involved
more than mere consensual encounters with police, since the defendant in this
case was pursued and ultimately physically forced to stop. '60 The Court reasoned
that there was no doubt that a "show of authority" occurred when the police chased
Hodari D. but that he was not seized until he was tackled by the police.'61
B. The Right-to-Inquire Rule
The Court throughout history has had a difficult time in assessing street-level
encounters between citizens and police. The Court has continued to use a set of
three tacit rules'62 that have laid the foundation for relaxing Fourth Amendment
scrutiny. Although no specific rule or standard has been chosen by the Court to
support police questioning on the street in every case, one rule in particular has
had much success in the past decade and was utilized by the Bostick Court. This
rule is referred to as the "right to inquire" rule.163 Under this rule, police officers
are allowed to stop and question any citizen about their public comings and go-
156. 111 S. Ct. 1547(1991).
157. Id. at 1550.
158. See supra notes 48-90 and accompanying text.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1549. Officers in this case chased the respondent and other youths after the youths ran upon seeing
the patrol car. Id. While running, the respondent discarded a small rock of crack cocaine and was subsequently
tackled by one of the officers. Id.
161. Id. at 1552. The Court consulted the common law in trying to interpret whether a seizure occurred, and if
so at what point it began.
Mere words will not constitute an arrest, while, on the other hand, no actual, physical touching is essen-
tial. The apparent inconsistency in the two parts of this statement is explained by the fact that an assertion
of authority and purpose to arrest followed by submission of the arrestee constitutes an arrest. There can
be no arrest without either touching or submission.
Rollin M. Perkins, The Law ofArrest, 25 IOWA L. REv. 201,206 (1940).
We do not think it desirable, even as a policy matter, to stretch the Fourth Amendment beyond its words
and beyond the meaning of arrest, as respondent urges. Street pursuits always place the public at some
risk, and compliance with police orders to stop should therefore be encouraged. Only a few of those or-
ders, we must presume, will be without adequate basis, and since the addressee has no ready means of
identifying the deficient ones it almost invariably is the responsible course to comply. Unlawful orders
will not be deterred, moreover, by sanctioning through the exclusionary rule those of them that are not
obeyed. Since policemen do not command "Stop!" expecting to be ignored, or give chase hoping to be
outrun, it fully suffices to apply the deterrent to their genuine, successful seizures.
California v. Hodari D., I IS. Ct. 1547, 1550 (1991).
162. See, e.g., Maclin, supr note 88, at 1258. The first rule is the "right to inquire" rule, which allows the
police to stop any citizen and ask questions. Id. The second is the "common sense" rule, under which the Court
allows only reasonable intrusion on citizens by police officers. Id. at 1278. Finally, the third rule involves
.waiver of privacy," which essentially states that citizens in public have waived their right to privacy by leaving
their home. Id. at 1228-30.
163. Id. at 1266.
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ings. 1" This rule has also been called the "common-law right of inquiry." 6 It is
apparent that the Terry1"' Court recognized the societal concern for law enforce-
ment and the increased risk of violence on the streets.
Following Terry, the Court was again faced with the question of whether certain
occasions warranted Fourth Amendment scrutiny. The first case, Davis v. Missis-
sippi,167 acknowledged that obtaining fingerprints from an individual without
probable cause would not be an exception to Fourth Amendment seizure require-
ments. 168 Also, in Adams v. Williams,169 Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the ma-
jority, disposed of Williams' Fourth Amendment claim where the officer pulled a
gun from Williams' waistband, even though the officer never saw the gun from
outside the car. 170 Justice Rehnquist declared:
Terry recognizes that it may be the essence of good police work to adopt an interme-
diate response. A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his
identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more informa-
tion, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time. 171
This standard was applied to the Williams' case, and the justification for seizing
the weapon and searching Williams was not because of probable cause or based on
the officer's personal observation. 
172
Despite the Davis-Williams extension of the "right-to-inquire" rule, police offi-
cers still could only use the rule in cases where there was a suspicious character or
where an individual posed a threat to them or society. 1 73 Basically, this meant that
police officers, in order to question someone, had to have articulable suspicion to
avoid Fourth Amendment scrutiny. '74
A decade later, the Court in Mendenhall separated the "right-to-inquire" rule
completely from Fourth Amendment review. 175 Although this case involved the
practice of criminal profiling which is arguably based on a reasonable suspicion,
Justice Stewart asserted that police conduct amounting to asking for identification
did not constitute a seizure. 176 Justice Stewart based his conclusion on Terry and
164. Id.
165. People v. De Bour, 352 N.E.2d 562, 572 (N.Y. 1976) (holding that at consensual levels, police-citizen
encounters are short of a forcible seizure and have no level of intrusion on the individual's rights). The court fur-
thermore stated that a citizen does not have any obligation to answer the police questions or to stay during the
questioning. Id. at 572.
166. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
167. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
168. Id. at 724.
169. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
170. Id. at 145-46.
171. Id. Although the Court appeared to recognize the importance of the right to inquire, this case is distin-
guishable in that the brief stop was based on reasonable suspicion. Id.
172. Id. at 146-49. The officer did, however, stop Williams based on reasonable suspicion after receiving a tip
from an unnamed source.
173. Maclin, supra note 88, at 1272.
174. Id.
175. Id. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
176. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555.
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Brown v. Texas.' In Brown, the Court alluded to just how far the "right-to-in-
quire" rule could go beyond the reach of Fourth Amendment protection. 178 Police
officers observed Brown in a dark alley located in a high crime area. 179 The offi-
cers stopped him, requested identification, and when Brown refused, the officers
arrested him.18 Justice Stewart concluded that up to the point of arrest, no seizure
had taken place even though the police did not suspect Brown of anything or have
probable cause to question him. 18'
Delgado82 and Chesternut8 are two recent cases that exemplify the "right-to-
inquire" rule born in Terry. Both of these cases indicate that no longer do individ-
uals have the right to come and go as they please on the streets; they only have the
right "to be free from an unduly intimidating police presence. ""' The Court in
Delgado upheld the INS's survey method of finding illegal aliens in work factor-
ies. 185 The survey method involved federal agents placing themselves at various lo-
cations in factories to randomly question employees and request identification
without articulable suspicion."18 Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority, as-
serted that an individual could be questioned by the police without triggering any
type of Fourth Amendment rights. 187 The Court held that interrogation "by itself,
[does not] constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure."188
The Court in Chesternut showed just how far police can go to satisfy their curi-
osity in a mere street encounter with an individual before such conduct treads on
Fourth Amendment grounds. 189 In Chesternut, officers observed two men, whom
they had no reason to suspect of any criminal activity, get out of a car and ap-
proach Chesternut. '90 When Chesternut saw the police officers, he ran, and the
police followed. 91 Chesternut was subsequently arrested for possession of cocaine
177. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
178. Maclin, supra note 88, at 1272 (citing Brown, 443 U.S. at 47-48).
179. Brown, 443 U.S. at 48-49.
180. Id. at49.
181. Id. at 52 (concluding that the balance between the public interest and an individual's right to privacy tilts in
favor of freedom from police interference absent any basis for suspecting misconduct by the citizen).
182. 486 U.S. 567 (1988).
183. 446 U.S. 210 (1984).
184. Maclin, supra note 88, at 1274-75.
185. Id. See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 220-21.
While persons who attempted to flee or evade the agents may eventually have been detained for question-
ing, [the factory workers] did not do so and were not in fact detained. The manner in which [the factory
workers] were questioned, given its obvious purpose, could hardly result in a reasonable fear that respon-
dents were not free to continue working or to move about the factory . . . . [Tihe encounters with the
INS agents satisfies us that the encounters were classic consensual encounters rather than Fourth Amend-
ment seizures.
Delgado, 466 U.S. at 220.
186. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 212-13.
187. Id. at 212.
188. Id. at 216 (stating that "[wihile most citizens will respond to a police request, the fact that people do so,
and do so without being told they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the re-
sponse"); see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
189. Maclin, supra note 88, at 1276-77 (citing Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988)).
190. Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 569.
191. Id.
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when he emptied drug packets from his pockets while attempting to elude po-
lice.192 Speaking for the majority, Justice Blackmun reasoned that even before
Chesternut ran, the "police were not required to have 'a particularized and objec-
tive basis for suspecting [Chesternut] of criminal activity,' in order to pursue
him.,,9
IV. INSTANT CASE RATIONALE
Justice O'Connor delivered the majority opinion of the Court and reviewed the
history of cases which demonstrated that a seizure does not occur simply because
a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.194 The Court
took note that such encounters will not automatically trigger Fourth Amendment
scrutiny unless the encounter loses its consensual nature.19
The Court made precisely this point in Terry v. Ohio, 9 where it recognized that
not all police contact with citizens involves "seizures" of persons.9 7 The Court
agreed that a seizure has occurred only when the officer has in some way re-
strained the liberty of the citizen by a show of authority or by physical force.
198
The respondent contended that a reasonable bus passenger in his position would
not have felt free to leave the bus since it was about to depart and there was no-
where to go. '99 The Florida Supreme Court found this argument persuasive, to the
point of adopting a per se rule prohibiting the police from randomly boarding
buses for drug interdiction purposes."O
The United States Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that, absent
the totality of the circumstances, it made no sense to focus only on whether a per-
son feels "free to leave," rather than consider other factors that might have a coer-
cive effect."0' The Court considered its holding in INS v. Delgado 2 as analytically
indistinguishable from the case at bar.2 3 The Court reasoned that the "free to
leave" analysis on which Bostick relied was inapplicable since the Delgado deci-
192. Id.
193. Id. at 568 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)). Although the officer in the
case referred to his action as a "chase," this characterization alone is not enough to implicate Fourth Amendment
protections. Id. at 574.
194. Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991).
195. Id. at 2386.
196. 392 U.S. I (1968).
197. Bostick, I I I S. Ct. at 2386; see Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n. 16. For a discussion of the Terry case, see supra
notes 48-69 and accompanying text.
198. Bostick, Ill S. Ct. at 2386.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 2387.
201. Id. at 2386; see also Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2391 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the test used by
the majority in determining whether a suspicionless bus sweep amounts to a Fourth Amendment "seizure," but
disagreeing with the majority's answer in dicta suggesting that Bostick was not seized).
202. 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
203. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2386. Like the workers in the Delgado case, Bostick's freedom to move about was
already restricted by an independent factor not associated with any police activity. His movement on the bus was
limited since it was about to leave the station. Id.
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sion was dispositive.2"4 The Court subsequently asserted that the crucial test was
whether, "taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter,
the police conduct would 'have communicated to a reasonable person that he was
not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business."25
The Court rejected Bostick's next argument that no reasonable person would
freely consent to a search of luggage that he or she knows contains drugs, reason-
ing that the "potential intrusiveness of the officers' conduct must be judged from
the viewpoint of an innocent person in [his] position."2'0
Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion stated that the State of Florida's tactic
of "sweeping the buses" is inconvenient, intrusive and intimidating.20 7 Justice
Marshall characterized the majority's holding as allowing police to board buses
without cause, and with a show of force or intimidation demand that passengers
voluntarily consent to searches and/or answer questions. 0 ' In no way, according
to Justice Marshall, can such action by the police be harmonized with the majori-
ty's holding requiring that consent not be a product of force, intimidation or har-
assment.209 Justice O'Connor found that the dissenting opinion suggested that
"[c]itizens do not forfeit their constitutional rights when they are coerced to com-
ply with a request that they would prefer to refuse."210 Justice O'Connor, writing
for the majority, held that the issue of whether or not Bostick "chose to permit the
search" should be decided by the Florida courts on remand.21" '
The dissent's strongest criticism was that the majority's ruling essentially al-
lows police officers to approach individuals, regardless of any type of reasonable
suspicion, and ask them all kinds of incriminating questions.212 The Bostick Court
204. Id. at 2387.
205. Id. (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988)).
206. Id. at 2388 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 519 n.4 (1983)); see also Chesternut, 486 U.S. at
574 (holding that "the reasonable person standard. . . ensures that the scope of Fourth Amendment protection
does not vary with the state of mind of the particular individual being approached").
207. Bostick, III S. Ct. at 2390 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 2393.
209. Id.
210. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2388.
211. Id.
212. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2390 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall pointed out in his dissenting opinion that
ironically, the courts within this so called "war on drugs" have been the most adamant in condemning this investi-
gatory practice.
[Tihe evidence in this cause has evoked images of other days, under other flags, when no man traveled his
nation's roads or railways without fear of unwarranted interruption, by individuals who held temporary
power in the Government. The spectra of American citizens being asked, by badge-wielding police, for
identification, travel papers - in short a raison d'etre - is foreign to any fair reading of the Constitution,
and its guarantee of human liberties. This is not Hitler's Berlin, nor Stalin's Moscow, nor is it white su-
premacist South Africa. Yet in Broward County, Florida, these police officers approach every person on
board buses and trains ("that time permits") and check identification [and] tickets, [and] ask to search
luggage-all in the name of "voluntary cooperation" with law enforcement ....
Id. at 2391 (quoting Florida v. Kerwick, 572 So. 2d 547, 548-49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)).
Quoting from the District Court fbr the District of Columbia, the dissenting opinion suggested that "[i]t seems
rather incongruous at this point in the world's history that we find totalitarian states becoming more like our free
society while we in this nation are taking on their fbrmer trappings of suppressed liberties and freedoms."
Id. at 2390 (quoting United States v. Lewis, 728 F. Supp. 784, 788-89 (D.D.C. 1990), rev'd, 921 F.2d 1294
(D.C. Cir. 1990)).
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noted that it has addressed this issue many times, as in the cases of Terry, Royer,
Rodriguez and Delgado, and the confines of a bus is but one relevant factor that
should be considered in evaluating whether a passenger's consent is voluntary
13
and whether the encounter became a seizure. The Court explicitly
adhere[d] to the rule that, in order to determine whether a particular encounter con-
stitutes a seizure, a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the en-
counter to determine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a
reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers' requests or
otherwise terminate the encounter. That rule applies to encounters that take place on
a city street or in an airport lobby, and it applies equally to encounters on a bus.
214
V. ANALYSIS
A. The Need for Drug Interdiction Programs
It is apparent from the majority opinion in Bostick that the Supreme Court sup-
ports Florida's effort in fighting the "war on drugs." In the past decade, there has
been an increasing national concern over drug trafficking in the United States. A
recent poll conducted by the Miami Herald indicated "that the American people
now view drugs as the most serious problem facing the nation."215 The widespread
use of illegal drugs has been linked to numerous violent crimes across America. 
21
As America's "war on drugs" continues, many innocent people caught in the cross-
fire will die unless something is done to suppress this criminal behavior.217 As ille-
gal drugs come into this country each year, billions of dollars will be lost due to
lack of economic growth, not to mention the violent effects of nationwide drug us-
age.
218
In response to these concerns, law enforcement officials in general have ex-
tended their efforts to combat this problem. 219 The Supreme Court, in turn, has
facilitated local law enforcement efforts by relaxing Fourth Amendment protec-
tions.220 One of these programs currently gaining more attention in the public is
213. Id. at 2389.
214. Id.
215. Kenneth C. Haas, The Supreme Court Enters the 'Jar Wars": Drug Testing, Public Employees, and the
Fourth Amendment, 94 DICK. L. REv. 305 (1990) (citing Drugs are No. 1 Woe, Poll Finds, Mixmi HERALD, Aug.
15, 1989, at IA).
216. Id.
217. John T. Schuler & Authur McBribe, Notes from the Front: A Dissident Law-Enforcement Perspective on
Drug Prohibition, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 893, 893 (1990) [hereinafter Schuler & McBribe].
218. Warren Cohen, War on Drugs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 24, 1990, at 12 [hereinafter Cohen].
In 1990, it was estimated that over 58.3 billion dollars were lost. Id.
219. Michael J. Flannery, Note, Abridged Too Far: Anticipatory Search Warrants and the Fourth Amendment, 32
WM. & MARY L. REv. 781, 782 (1991) ("[als a result, American jails are literally overflowing with criminals
who are being apprehended in greater numbers and sentenced to stiffer terms").
220. Review, supra note 1, at 565-68. The Court in Bostick purports to alleviate some of the more stringent
barriers that restrict legitimate law enforcement practices. If the police are going to be an effective deterrent in
our society's "war on drugs" then the courts have to allow some of the more aggressive programs, such as sweep-
ing the buses, to work. Only in the extreme situations, where the individual's liberty outweighs the government's
interest in fighting this crime will there be justification for requiring the stricter approach.
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referred to as "sweeping the buses."221 These suspicionless sweeps,222 which en-
compass all types of areas, provide law enforcement with a way to increase arrests
and prevent illegal drug trafficking. These various drug interdiction programs are
generated by public demand for results, and by the need of elected officials to
show encouraging success from their efforts .223 Although these dragnet-type en-
counters often provide overwhelming numbers of convictions, they have numer-
ous flaws that lead to a litany of Fourth Amendment complaints regarding seizures
and the suppression of evidence obtained by subsequent searches.224
Many criticize these interdiction programs as leading to overcrowding court
dockets and overburdening prosecutors.225 Justice Marshall in his dissenting opin-
ion in Florida v. Bostick221 criticized these sweeps by asserting that
[tihe random indiscriminate stopping and questioning of individuals on interstate
busses seems to have gone too far. If this Court approves such "bus stops" and allows
prosecutions to be based on evidence seized as a result of such "stops," then we will
have stripped our citizens of basic constitutional protections. Such action would be
inconsistent with what this nation has stood for during its 200 years of existence
.... In this "anything goes" war on drugs, random knocks on the doors of our citi-
zens' homes seeking "consent" to search for drugs cannot be far away. This is not
America.227
There is no doubt that the pressure to make more arrests and seize more drugs is
prevalent in our society. To suggest that this drug problem will be resolved on its
own is senseless. These interdiction programs can help deter the problematic issue
of drug trafficking. By giving police agencies more discretion to enact certain
drug interdiction programs in their area, the criminal justice system can take a
"bite out of crime. "228
Regardless of its criticism, the public at large appears to respond favorably to
these interdiction programs .229 Former President Bush's proposal for anti-drug
221. For a discussion on this investigatory technique, see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
222. Reasonable suspicion is a constitutional standard which requires that an officer's suspicion be based on
specific facts and inferences that would lead a reasonable person under those same circumstances to believe that
the individual being stopped is in the act of committing a crime, has committed a crime, or will be committing a
crime in the near future. This reasonable suspicion allows the officer to determine whether he should arrest the
individual or investigate further. C .'Asr, supra note 12, at 37. A suspicionless sweep, that is, a police contact
that does not require reasonable suspicion or any other criteria, is allowed if the initial contact is voluntary, and
there is no use of police authority or compulsion. Id. at 41.
223. Schuler & McBribe, supra note 217, at 919.
224.Id. at 920.
225. Id. at 920 (stating that although street level encounters account for a majority of the number of arrests,
nevertheless, the deplorable conditions that already exist in most cities play an important role in increasing the
demand and the arrests made).
226. 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991).
227. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2391 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Lewis, 728 F. Supp. 784,
788 (D.D.C. 1990), rev'd, 921 F.2d 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
228. With the use of drug interdiction programs like the one in Bostick, criminal justice systems across Amer-
ica will be able to have an impact on crime and possibly have some deterrent effect.
229. An example of this public support would be the repeated election of government officials who run on the
'war on drugs" platform that continue to represent their constituents' concerns on how their tax dollar is spent.
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programs - like that of Florida's - in 1990 was $7.8 billion. 20 The public can con-
tinue to help police by supporting increases in funding, training for law enforce-
ment, modernizing equipment, and expanding intelligence; but without a program
to implement these improvements, they are a waste of the taxpayer's money.231 If
America is sincere about waging a "war on drugs," then we owe it to police offi-
cers and the future victims of drug violence" 2 to implement certain aggressive tac-
tics - like "sweeping the buses" - to suppress the illegal drugs being trafficked in
our cities, schools and playgrounds.
The majority in Bostick sent a clear message to law enforcement and trial courts
in allowing these suspicionless sweeps by adding the inside of a bus to the already
growing list of locations where police can approach citizens and ask them ques-
tions and request consent to search their belongings. Not only is a majority of the
Court supportive of the program, but it seems that the Court is forewarning the
public that these drug interdiction programs will soon be a routine part of travel in
America.2 3 Objecting to this logic, Justice Marshall argued that these drug
sweeps not only infringe on Fourth Amendment rights, but the initial questioning
of the passengers is not even based on vague hunches or articulable suspicion.
3 4
This leads to the question of whether, in spite of the overwhelming support of these
interdiction programs, the Bostick Court has adequately defined the appropriate
inquiry to be used in determining whether a seizure occurs and whether these
sweeps can be executed absent a seizure.
In assessing street-level police-citizen encounters, the Bostick Court purports to
balance the constitutionally protected interests of the individual being questioned
against the societal need for this drug interdiction program to maximize police
protection.23 The Bostick Court is silent as to what basis it used in allowing the
suspicionless sweep on the bus, but it appears that the doctrinal foundation for its
230. See Richard L. Berke, Public Enemy No. 1: A War on Drugs is a Necessary Riskfor Bush, N. Y Times, Sept.
3, 1989, §4, at I (noting since Reagan's term, President Bush has increased the "anti-drug" budget for 1990 by
proposing a $7.8 billion fund. This is quite an increase compared to Reagan's $1.1 billion expenditure for this
cause).
231. See Cohen, supra note 218, at 13.
232. Schuler & McBribe, supra note 217, at 893. Without these drug interdiction efforts by local as well as
national police, drug trafficking will continue to overwhelm our society with its corruption and will harm not
only our economy, but will also affect the sanctity of human life by forcing us to live with the violence, dislocation
and suffering of the drug trade. Id.
233. Ira Mickenberg, CriminalRulings Granted the State BroadNew Power, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 19, 1991, at 510.
234. Id. (citing Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2389 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). Justice Marshall suggests
that the Fourth Amendment clearly condemns the suspicionless sweeps of buses. Bostick, 11I S. Ct. at 2394.
The absence of these dragnet-type sweeps would not render the police helpless, since they can still approach pas-
sengers whom they have a reasonable, articulable basis to suspect and ask them questions. Id. All in all, the police
would have the same power, only this time they would need the requisite suspicion to carry out the investigation.
Id. at 2394-95.
235. Maclin, supra note 88, at 1265.
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decision was the "right-to-inquire" rule. The rule essentially allows law enforce-
ment officers freedom to inquire about the public comings and goings of individ-
uals. 
2 3 7
Some criticize the "right-to-inquire" rule as giving too much weight to police
interest at the expense of Fourth Amendment rights of citizens.38 Justice Mar-
shall, dissenting in Bostick, argued that "[t]he random indiscriminate stopping and
questioning of individuals on interstate buses seems to have gone too far."239 He
also stated that "[i]f this Court approves such 'bus stops' then we basically have
stripped our citizens of [their] constitutional rights." 24" To the contrary, however,
it is the rights of citizens that the police desire to protect. The only problem with
the majority's reliance on this theory is the failure to separate the distinction be-
tween drug interdiction cases and other cases in general.
Taken at face value, the majority's position would essentially leave the police
with unfettered discretion to question and harass citizens on buses, in schools, and
in other public places regardless of the governmental interest involved. There is no
doubt that the government's interest in fighting the "war on drugs" by using drug
interdiction programs can outweigh Fourth Amendment protection. This does not
mean that Fourth Amendment rights are waived, but it does mean that a more
flexible barrier is placed between police and citizens to permit such investigatory
practices. Police officers, therefore, are not forced to invent some type of reason-
able suspicion to question a citizen to avoid being chastised later with Fourth
Amendment scrutiny for their subsequent actions.
The Bostick Court also left the question as to the scope of the holding unan-
swered. The Court failed to recognize the fact that this balancing test of govern-
mental interests versus citizens' Fourth Amendment rights can be affected by the
location of the action itself. For example, Florida's interest in protecting its citi-
zens' welfare and safety is arguably much greater than, for instance, the same in-
terest in North Dakota, due to the heavy targeting of Florida as a drug haven.
There are obviously some states where these types of drug interdiction programs
236. Id. There are three tacit rules that are applied in decisions involving police-citizen encounters. Id. The
first is the "right to inquire" rule which allows the police broad discretion in questioning citizens in public places.
Id. The second basis used is the "common sense" rule which limits the officers' discretion in stopping and ques-
tioning someone on the street. Id. Finally, the third rule is the "waiver of privacy" rule which asserts that certain
police intrusions are permissible and should be tolerated even if they occurred at the individual's home, and that
the citizen has essentially waived his right of privacy against intrusions by being out in the public. Id. at 1265-66.
237. Id. at 1266. The majority in Bostick relied on United States v. Mendenhall, which represented the impor-
tance the Court attached to police questioning and Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Maclin, supra note 88, at 1274-
75.
It would appear that the majority of the situations in which police question citizens about their comings and
goings would normally be based on a reasonable suspicion. The mere fact that an officer would even ask a person
where he or she is going would suggest that the officer has already developed some type of suspicion of the citi-
zen. For a historical view of the "right to inquire" rule, see supra notes 164-193 and accompanying text.
238. At times the government's interest may outweigh the person's Fourth Amendment rights where, for exam-
ple, the general welfare of the public is at stake as compared to minimal interference with a person that causes
some inconvenience.
239. Bostick, I I S. Ct. at 2391 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Lewis, 728 F. Supp. 784,
789 (D.D.C. 1990), rev'd, 921 F2d 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
240. Id.
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are legitimate concerns and vital to the citizens' general welfare. In these states,
undoubtedly, the courts would have justification for allowing police more discre-
tion and indeed, tolerate certain investigatory practices that border on constitu-
tional infringements. Nevertheless, the Court fails to make that observation and
only appears to recognize the national concern as a whole. This idealogy is not
necessarily wrong, but it is insignificant in trying to fairly evaluate whether a sei-
zure occurs and determining under what circumstances a court is going to show
deference to a particular interest involved.
Florida is a prime example of a state that warrants the use of drug interdiction
programs in certain areas and where heightened governmental interests should be
acknowledged. Without suspicionless sweeps and in the absence of the Bostick
holding, thousands of drug traffickers would enter our borders each day with a
new supply of illegal drugs. This in fact would jeopardize the rights of citizens in
Florida and throughout the United States to be free from the violence and intimida-
tion that drug couriers inject into our communities. Although a few individuals'
sensitivities may be ignored, as a whole, society is benefitted by alleviating some
of the constitutional restrictions on police officers during mere street or public en-
counters.
B. The Physical Restraint and "Show ofAuthority" Standard
Fourth Amendment scrutiny does apply when a person's privacy is intruded
upon by police conduct that amounts to an unreasonable search and seizure. This
heightened constitutional mandate is imposed on law enforcement officials when
there is evidence of an unreasonable seizure. Before that determination, however,
there must first be evidence that a seizure might exist. This issue of "what consti-
tutes a seizure" in regard to mere consensual police encounters with citizens, has
been extremely problematic for the Supreme Court for a number of years.241 The
Supreme Court in Bostick was indeed cautious about defining a seizure, and since
the Terry decision in 1968, the Court has struggled with the meaning of the term in
these circumstances. 242
In Bostick, the majority as well as the dissenting Justices recognized that "not
all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of per-
sons" and "[o]nly when the officer, by means of physical force or a show of au-
thority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen" may a seizure occur.243
In either case, the Bostick Court appeared to suggest that the person's physical lib-
erty to move about must be directly restrained.
241. For a chronological history of the problems the Court has faced in defining when a police contact turns into
a seizure, see supra notes 48-161 and accompanying text.
242. See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984) (giving a synopsis of the inconsistency the Court has had
in determining at what point a seizure occurs during a mere police-citizen encounter).
243. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2386 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16 (1967)).
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1. Physical Restraint
The physical restraint factor developed in Terry is not a difficult issue since it
would be quite easy to tell if a person like Bostick has been physically seized. Most
of the cases that have dealt with a physical seizure have not been seriously con-
tested. There are numerous ways in which a person may be physically seized:
reaching out and actually grabbing the individual, 2" using physical force to pre-
vent the person from leaving,245 forming a roadblock in order that the suspect's car
will physically crash into it for detention purposes,24 6 or firing a shot into a suspect
who is running from police.247
This requisite of a physical restraint, as simple as it is, is still a necessary part of
the appropriate inquiry used in Bostick. Although the Bostick Court unveiled its
support for the historical foundation of the test, the Court realized that the physical
restraint standard is not alone today. From the Bostick Court's reasoning, it might
appear that any time the police-citizen encounter results in physical contact it au-
tomatically becomes a seizure. There are times, however, when the contact is no
more than a friendly gesture. 2" Physical contact will constitute a seizure and usu-
ally be decisive, but probably the most coercive explicit restraint on a person's lib-
erty is not physical contact but is by some "show of authority" by the police
officer. 249
2. A Show of Authority
The second factor still used today and implemented in the Bostick approach is
the "show of authority" test in determining whether a person has been seized.250
244. See, e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 67 (1968) (defendant was seized when policeman grabbed
defendant's collar). But cf Delgado, 466 U.S. at 220 (touching a person on the shoulder alone did not constitute a
seizure).
245. See, e.g., Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985) (detention of person at police station constituted
seizure); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981) (resident was seized when police detained him while
executing search warrant); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979) (defendant was seized when police physically
detained him after his refusal to answer questions); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207 (1979) (defendant
was seized when he was forced to accompany police officers back to the police station).
246. See Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599 (1989) (defendant was considered seized when he was
stopped in the car he was driving by a police roadblock).
247. Any time a person is apprehended by some sort of use of deadly force by police then, for Fourth Amend-
ment purposes, that person is seized. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985).
248. See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 220. The police provide a variety of services on the street. These might include
general peace-keeping, traffic control, and emergency assistance. Emily J. Sack, Note, Police Approaches and
Inquiries on the Streets of New York: The Aftermath of People v. De Bour, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 512, 513 (1991)
[hereinafter Sack].
249. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
250. Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2387 (1991) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n. 16). Absent any type of
physical contact by police, in order to constitute a seizure there must be some sort of "show of authority" by the
police officer. Id.
These circumstances might include: (1) the threatening presence of several officers; (2) the display of a weapon
by the seizing officers; (3) physical contact between the officer and the citizen; or (4) language or demeanor of
the officer indicating that compliance with the officer's request may be compelled. Barry Sorrels & Lawrence B.
Mitchell, Criminal Procedure: Arrest, Search and Seizure, 43 Sw. L.J. 523, 527 n.29 (1989). In the absence of
these circumstances or physical contact, then inoffensive contact between a police officer and a citizen, as a mat-
ter of law, cannot amount to a seizure. LAFAvE, supra note 64, at 53-55.
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This standard basically means that a person can be mentally seized as well as
physically seized by police personnel."' This mental seizure essentially amounts
to a person being so scared or intimidated to move about that he or she is confined
to one area. The intimidation is usually the result of police conduct, questioning,
or may be physical in nature.
Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion in Bostick, inexplicably characterized
the facts in the case as amounting to a "show of authority."22 Although the major-
ity avoided reaching a conclusion as to this question, Justice Marshall's dissent
strongly protested that the stipulated facts present in the case were significant
proof that Bostick was coercively pressured by the officers.2"3
The Bostick Court recognized the necessity of the principle, established in Men-
denhall, that in order to use this "show of authority" inquiry, a totality of the cir-
cumstances analysis must be implemented to consider all the factors involved, not
just one.25 4 Placing so much weight on one single issue would lead to characteriz-
ing every police-citizen encounter as a "seizure" under Fourth Amendment scru-
tiny.255 Moreover, it would impose "wholly unrealistic restrictions upon a wide
variety of legitimate law enforcement practices" and not allow police officers to
use citizen questioning as a "tool [for] effective enforcement of the criminal
laws."256 Certain guilty parties would never be prosecuted, and the possibility of
false arrest would also exist.25 7 In sum, the security for all of society would be
jeopardized.
C. The Reasonable Person Standard Still Applies in Bostick
The Supreme Court in Bostick asserted that its decision based on the "reason-
able person" standard had broken no new ground. 258 The majority, without a
doubt, utilized the objective test established in Mendenhall but failed to support it
or weigh its merits. 259 Regardless of all its possible advantages, the test basically
disregards an individual's sensitivities and personal characteristics which make
that person unique and focuses instead on a majority safeguard which allows
courts to exercise their pro-law enforcement views. Apparently, the majority in
Bostick saw no need to concentrate on an individual's personal sensitivities, which
at times could aid the Court in determining whether a person, like Bostick, was
seized. Many people could claim seizure due to personal intimidation by the po-
251. Clancy, supra note 39, at 623.
252. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2392-93 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall asserted that the facts in the
case exhibited all of the elements of coercion associated with a "show of authority." Id. at 2392. The officers
made a visible display of their guns, and they wore police jackets bearing the police insignia. Id.
253. Id. at 2392-93.
254. See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980) (significant factor in determining that
no seizure occurred was that officers wore no uniforms during their questioning).
255. Id. at 554.
256. Id.





lice because of previous bad experiences, guilty consciences or anti-law enforce-
ment sentiment in citizens who promote being seized as an attack against
individualism and privacy.
If the limited holding in Bostick is taken literally, there will be times that a po-
lice-citizen encounter will result in a seizure even though the person seized knew
his or her constitutional right to refuse answering questions. Is it necessary that we
now ask all citizens who are considered seized to determine if they subjectively
knew they were not coerced by police or pressured into answering questions? This
is one of the flaws of the "reasonable person" approach that Justice O'Connor and
the majority failed to discuss. Although not present in Bostick, there could be
times when the individual seized in no way felt encumbered or restrained by po-
lice, but because of the objective standard, the individual's position is disregarded
while a court determines what the average citizen under the circumstances would
do or feel.
This objective analysis will likely result in courts compiling statistics to match
certain police encounters in determining a reasonable person's view under the cir-
cumstances. If individual rights and self-determination are what the Fourth
Amendment is designed to protect, then this test, at times, is a two-edged sword
that can actually avoid the personal interest involved. On one hand, critics can ar-
gue that the "reasonable person" test gives police more discretion in their investi-
gative efforts. On the other hand, an argument can be made that this standard is a
neutral and realistic approach that preserves the common interests of the person
seized (since that person might not be aware of specific constitutional rights),
while at the same time setting requisite criteria for law enforcement to meet in this
type of police-citizen encounter.
1. The Totality of the Circumstances
In addition to adhering to this objective test, the majority in Bostick relied on
the Mendenhall decision which broadened the scope of seizure to include factors
not depicted in the "show of authority" test.260 This new test, although accepted by
the Bostick Court, was previously adopted by the Court just six years earlier. 261
260. Id. at 2388-89.
261. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984). There was a general consensus at that time that the Justices ap-
proved the objective test. Id. Applying the "reasonable person" test, the Court in Delgado held that certain em-
ployees questioned by police at their workplace were not seized since most reasonable people under the totality of
the circumstances would not have felt seized. Id. at 216. The Court reasoned that if police questioning inside the
factory does not amount to a seizure then it is no more a seizure when it occurs outside. Id. at 218.
While most citizens will respond to a police request, the fact that people do so, and do so without being
told they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the response. Unless the cir-
cumstances of the encounter are so intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable person would have
believed he was not free to leave if he had not responded, one cannot say that the questioning resulted in a
[seizure] under the Fourth Amendment. But if the person refuses to answer and the police take additional
steps. . . to obtain an answer, then the Fourth Amendment imposes some minimal level of objective jus-
tification to validate the detention or seizure.
Id. at 216-17.
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The majority was correct when it observed that in determining whether a sei-
zure occurs, all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter must be taken into
consideration.262 This is extremely important in deciding whether a reasonable
person would have felt free to leave or decline the officer's questions. The key in
making this determination is whether the police conduct would have communi-
cated this to a reasonable person. The only plausible way to justify this determina-
tion is to include all the factors involved. The Bostick Court pointed out correctly
that the cramped confines of a bus is a relevant factor to consider, but like any
other circumstance, it cannot be dispositive in every encounter.23 There might be,
for example, times when a bus passenger feels restrained by the police due to the
cramped area inside the bus. There might also be a situation, however, notwith-
standing the limited area of movement on the bus, where the passenger feels com-
pelled not to leave because of some other non-police factor."
2. The Free to Leave Analysis
There is no doubt that the "reasonable person" test is based on whether most
reasonable people would feel free to leave a police-citizen encounter. This "free to
leave" analysis dates back to the Mendenhall decision,26 and has been extremely
popular with the Court in recent years.266 The Bostick Court accurately decided
that the appropriate inquiry in this type of encounter is not whether a reasonable
person would feel "free to leave" but whether a reasonable person would feel free
to decline to answer the questions and terminate the encounter.2 67 A person in Bos-
tick's shoes would have at no time felt free to leave the bus, since it was scheduled
to depart momentarily. The Court makes it clear, however, that it is not abandon-
ing this "free to leave" analysis in every case,268 but only in instances like those
present in Bostick where that analysis alone would often convey that a seizure oc-
curred, when in fact it did not.
D. The Bostick Approach
Coming two months after the Court's decision in Hodari D., the limited holding
in Bostick uncovered nothing new and was primarily consistent with the seminal
cases already decided by the Court.269 What the case does represent is that the
262. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2389.
263. Id.
264. These factors might include: (1) the departure of the bus; (2) the fear of losing a reserved seat; or (3) the
potential of losing one's persona property on the bus.
265. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
266. See, e.g., INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210,216-17 (1984).
267. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2387.
268. Id. The Court recognized that the "free to leave" analysis is not workable in every case. Id. That is, there
are some circumstances where a person is not free to leave but is not seized. Id. In this type of encounter, like the
one present in Bostick, a more appropriate inquiry is to take into account all the circumstances and determine
whether a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police questions or otherwise terminate the encoun-
ter. Id.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 48-133.
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Court realized the importance of changing the inquiry to realistically adhere to the
circumstances in determining whether a seizure has occurred.
The Bostick Court will be most notable for allowing police -especially in the
state of Florida -expanded discretion in their drug interdiction programs. This
discretion is increased by holding that the appropriate inquiry for "bus sweeps" is
not whether a reasonable person would feel "free to leave," but whether a reason-
able person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his or her busi-
ness.27 The Court, to some extent, abandoned the "free to leave" analysis
established in Mendenhall and used throughout the decade in other police-citizen
encounters. Justice Marshall, speaking for the dissent and joined by Justice Black-
mun and Justice Stevens, was more concerned with Florida's practice of "sweep-
ing the buses" than he was with determining the appropriate standard to be
used.27 ' Throughout most of Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion, he illustrated
the intrusiveness and burdensome practice that this program causes.72
Ironically, the dissenting opinion agreed with Justice O'Connor's majority con-
clusion that the appropriate inquiry should be whether a passenger "would feel free
to decline the officer's request[] or otherwise terminate the encounter."273 The dis-
sent's strongest criticism was that it disagreed with the majority's suggestion in
dicta that Bostick may not have been seized.274
Professor LaFave contends that police have to be allowed to seek cooperation
from citizens, even when their actions may involve inconvenience or embarrass-
ment to the citizens.27 At most, this is the effect that Florida's effort to fight the
"war on drugs" may cause. This is not to say that such consensual encounters on
buses, trains or even planes could not change into a seizure. A police-citizen en-
counter constitutes a seizure, however, only when the officer increases the inher-
ent pressure "by engaging in conduct significantly beyond that accepted in social
intercourse."276
270. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2386-87.
271. Bostick, Ill S. Ct. at 2389-91 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Although the Court's position as to the program
itself is important, in this case the primary issue was whether the interdiction program can be performed without
articulable suspicion and not whether the program is liked or disliked.
272. Id.
273. Bostick, Ill S. Ct. at 2387.
274. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2391-94 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
275. See LAFAVE, 2d ed., supra note 41, at 411.
"Right now, the police have to do what they have to do.. .. Unfortunately, there are good kids who are
stopped and searched. But I've heard people say: 'In these times, I don't mind. My child being searched
and having nothing is better than me seeing him in a coffin.' Instead of us yelling about the constitutional
rights of the kids. . . we have to explain to them that times are hard right now. And we have to think
about the constitution of safety. If you handcuff the police, who do you have?"
Sack, supra note 248, at 512 (quoting Hays, Boston Agonizes Over Street Violence, N.Y. TtMes, Oct. 28, 1989, at
A8)).
[T]he history of liberty has largely been the history of observance of procedural safeguards. And the his-
tory of the destruction of liberty, one may add, has largely been the history of the relaxation of those safe-
guards in the face of plausible-sounding governmental claims of a need to deal with widely frightening
and emotion-freighted threats to the good order of society.
Sack, supra note 248, at 512 (citing McNabb v. U.S., 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943)).
276. LAFAvE, 2d ed., supra note 41, at 412.
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The Florida State Supreme Court's logic as well as that of Justice Marshall's
dissent in support of this unconstitutional per se rule for bus sweeps is irrational.
Obviously certain police interdiction programs cannot function flawlessly. Stat-
utes are full of ambiguities, but legislatures do not repeal every law that has some
fundamental faults. If the Florida State Supreme Court's reasoning is taken seri-
ously, then all statutes would essentially have to function without some cumber-
some difficulties or be repealed. The U.S. Constitution itself has created much
controversy through the years with its ambiguities and interpretative flaws. There
are currently no constitutional mandates requiring perfection, and it is apparent
that the state supreme court's approach is unrealistically burdensome to the law
enforcement personnel of Florida and to society in general.
To the individuals who allege these combative efforts by law enforcement are
intrusive and unconstitutional, Florida answers by burdening police and society
with an overwhelmingly restrictive rule which asserts that all bus encounters by
police are unconstitutional. This rule would basically mean that every time a po-
lice officer boards a bus to ask questions, Fourth Amendment scrutiny is impli-
cated and results in an immediate seizure. As a middle ground, however, the only
exception to this rule would be if the questions were mere pleasantries .277 Such
reasoning would thwart law enforcement efforts to stop the trafficking of illegal
drugs. If such a per se analysis would have been affirmed by the Bostick Court, the
ultimate result would leave drug traffickers with less police interference and allow
the drug couriers to have a transport system that is actually guarded by the Consti-
tution as well as local police.
Another absurdity of this logic is that if taken literally, when an officer boarded
a bus to aid a passenger on a consensual matter, a seizure would take place. Al-
though there might be a middle ground argument as stated above, the state su-
preme court and Justice Marshall's dissent failed to even mention it. This
reasoning is contrary to all the principles established from Terry to Bostick and es-
sentially ignores the legal standard that is founded on what a "reasonable person"
would feel or do under the circumstances. An affirmation by the Bostick Court
would have essentially overlooked any significant factors that might have war-
ranted the nonexistence of a seizure.
In her majority opinion, Justice O'Connor asserted that the Bostick case was in-
distinguishable from the holding in Delgado.278 The Court recognized the similar-
ity in that the workers' movement in Delgado was restricted by a factor
independent of any type of police activity.27
Even Justice Marshall's assertion in his dissenting opinion28 suggested that the
"free to leave" analysis was gone or was on the way out.28 A person on a bus,
277. A non-investigatory question might consist of questions regarding the weather, directions or even friendly
conversation.
278. Bostick, I IlS. Ct. at 2387.
279. Id.
280. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. at 2389 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
281. Id. at 2391-94.
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train, or even a plane is not going to feel free to leave, regardless of who or what
has boarded the vehicle. To allow this restrictive analysis to stand would force the
Court in every case to hold that a person is seized automatically when he or she
cannot leave. Another problem with this per se test is that, although objective in
nature, it would provide a loophole for guilty parties to slip through the hands of
justice. A passenger knowing that he or she has drugs obviously will not feel free
to leave for fear of further interrogation.
2 82
The Court appropriately pointed out that the inquiry to be used with police-citi-
zen encounters is whether a "reasonable person would feel free to decline the offi-
cers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. "283 This test appears to ignore
the "locomotion"284argument and concentrates more on the individual's subjective
sense of refusal. Some may criticize the test in that such refusal would then profile
that person as a guilty party and burden that party with further interrogation as
soon as he or she left the bus. A refusal by a passenger to answer questions would
likely give the police officers the reasonable suspicion they need to seize the indi-
vidual. The police would immediately target that individual as a potential suspect,
but as soon as that individual's right of refusal is prohibited or restrained by some
means, then that person is physically seized, whether on the bus or not. So in a
sense, one might argue that all the citizen is doing by refusing is deferring the sei-
zure until a later time. Nevertheless, mere questioning by police is not a seizure,
and if a citizen consents to subsequent questions or a search, then that citizen has
essentially waived a request for Fourth Amendment protection.
The one problem with this standard is that it gives police officers too much lati-
tude in creating their own reasonable suspicion. For example, an officer with a
mere hunch that a certain passenger is carrying drugs can create reasonable suspi-
cion by pressuring the passenger to refuse to answer the questions. Once the pas-
senger elects that choice, the officer has laid a proper foundation for seizing that
person without the fear of having the illegal drug evidence suppressed.
The Supreme Court's approach in Bostick is not a limitation of Fourth Amend-
ment rights, nor does it favor police responsibility over individual constitutional
rights. What the Court does suggest is that although a person has certain funda-
mental rights that are and should be protected, the totality of the circumstances
must be considered in determining whether these rights have been violated. There
are no enumerated powers specifically restricting what the police can do or say. To
uphold an unconstitutional per se rule would be, in a sense, to ignore the Constitu-
tion and to allow such informal amendments as the state courts deem necessary.
282. The reasonable person test presupposes an innocent person. Thus, an individual cannot argue that he or
she must have been seized because no reasonable person would freely consent to a search if that person knows it
will turn up illegal drugs. Id. at 2388. "This 'reasonable person' standard . . . ensures that the scope of Fourth
Amendment protection does not vary with the state of mind of the particular individual being approached." Id.
(quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574 (1988)).
283. Id. at 2387.
284. See, e.g., Maclin, supra note 88, at 1258.
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DETERMINING WHATCONSTITUTESA SEIZURE
The Supreme Court's holding in Bostick adds no great judicial revelation but
does add a bit of a twist to its historic rhetoric regarding seizures. Although, the
Court laid a new foundation with a different inquiry for bus searches, it failed to
completely answer the forbidden question of what constitutes a seizure in these cir-
cumstances. Law enforcement personnel, as well as those caught in the cross-fire
of our criminal justice system, should have a concrete standard that does not
change from one occasion to the next. It appears that the Supreme Court with all
of its logic could formulate a broader test or at least a guideline that could be used
in all citizen-police encounters. Eventually, this question will have to be answered
by the Court as more and more of these drug interdiction programs are utilized.
The Court will soon feel the cumbersome effect that a flexible test will have as
their docket increases due to broad police discretion and as the test is constitution-
ally challenged by the likely numerous defendants. Although certain per se rules
may at times be constitutionally favored and predictable, the one proposed in Bos-
tick is by far too restrictive and realistically unworkable for similar situations like
that of "sweeping the buses." If the Court does not determine a more plausible ba-
sic standard for police-citizen encounters, however, then it must be prepared to ex-
pand the increasing list of various encounters that could trigger Fourth
Amendment rights. It would be unrealistic for the Court to adopt such a list, since
these encounters could ultimately take place anywhere and at anytime.
Another obvious problem with the Bostick holding was that the Court failed to
recognize that its appropriate inquiry was not complete. Although the "free to
leave" analysis is not exclusive after Bostick, this test should have been coupled
with the Bostick approach to encompass all the specifics of each police-citizen en-
counter. By including such a standard, law enforcement personnel could be prop-
erly trained in using heightened discretion in these circumstances.
Additionally, more comprehensive guidelines could be mandated to allow both
a constitutional shield for the individual citizen and more flexible investigatory
tactics to protect a state's interest. This would ultimately lead to more efficient po-
lice work and decrease the number of times illegal drugs are eventually suppressed
due to overzealous police officers trying to make an arrest.
VI. CONCLUSION
The use of drug interdiction programs, like Florida's, allows police officers to
board buses and ask questions instead of asking the passengers off the bus or hold-
ing them up at the ticket counter. Inconvenient as it may be, the program generates
much success in fighting illegal drug trafficking in America. It is the citizens of
America who will suffer from per se rules like the one established by the Florida
State Supreme Court. Distasteful as such programs are, to counteract the intrusive
and lethal problems that drugs inject into our society, more support has to be given
for drug interdiction efforts to protect, as a whole, America's right to be drug free.
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